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This thesis analyzes the implications of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities on the use of aircraft carriers in executing U.S. maritime strategy. The 
objective is to determine if there are historical lessons from previous U.S. experiences 
with A2/AD capabilities that bear relevance on the current debate. Additionally, it 
analyzes several proposed alternatives to the aircraft carrier. It argues that there are 
several relevant lessons from previous A2/AD challenges with aircraft carriers and the 
United States’ ability to conduct sea control and power projection, and that none of the 
aircraft carrier alternatives can sufficiently provide the necessary capabilities across a 
range of military operations. It concludes that incorporating innovative employment of 
carrier strike groups in an A2/AD environment, while also pursuing advancements in the 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aircraft carrier has long served as a defining symbol of the United States of 
America’s military capability and national prosperity. Its ability to transport an air wing’s 
strike capability across the world’s oceans–nearly three-quarters of the Earth’s surface– 
and deliver air power without the need for diplomatic arrangements of land-based 
alternatives has provided U.S. leaders with valuable options for responding to crises 
around the world. Also, the high financial cost of its construction serves as a testament to 
the financial strength of the United States. The true value of a warship, however, lies in 
what it is credibly capable of doing. There has been ample debate over the past several 
years concerning the aircraft carrier’s viability in the modern security environment. The 
advent of long-range anti-access capabilities, such as ground-based anti-ship cruise 
missiles, combined with the decreasing striking range of carrier air wings, greatly 
increases the likelihood of aircraft carriers having to operate within range of modern anti-
access systems. Considering the growing threat from long-range anti-access weapons and 
the high cost of building and maintaining modern aircraft carriers, this thesis examines 
the question: what are the implications of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities on the use of aircraft carriers in executing U.S. maritime strategy? As a 
corollary, how might the United States respond to A2/AD capabilities from either an 
operational or technical perspective? Finally, does the aircraft carriers’ performance, or 
any of its proposed alternatives, against A2/AD capabilities warrant a shift in the aims of 
U.S. maritime strategy, a shift in force structure, or both? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The latest declaration of U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower, cites the technological advancement and growing proliferation of 
A2/AD capabilities as a significant challenge to U.S. and allied global maritime access.1 
                                                 
1 James Dunford, Jonathan Greenert, and Paul Zukunft, Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2015), 1. 
 2 
Considering the vital role access to the maritime commons plays in the execution of any 
naval function, the Cooperative Strategy goes so far as to add “all domain access” to the 
list of essential functions the Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) shall 
provide.2 While the Cooperative Strategy expounds on the role the Sea Services play in 
executing national security and national military strategies, it fails to describe the 
necessary force structure required to meet its demands.  
The challenges modern A2/AD capabilities pose to current maritime strategies 
and military units have led many to debate the utility of the Navy’s current force structure 
and reconsider future procurement plans.3 Various organizations have pursued an 
operational analysis approach toward designing an optimum “balanced” fleet, specifically 
in how to improve its striking capability. The new A2/AD weapon systems significantly 
complicate military options, limiting the locations for ground-based assets, forcing carrier 
strike groups and their air wings to operate at greater ranges, and limiting their freedom 
to gain positional advantage. Additionally, the threat of modern A2/AD capabilities, 
combined with the present fiscal environment, have forced U.S. officials to weigh the 
strategic benefits of aircraft carriers against their operational risk in an A2/AD 
environment. 
Considering the range of modern anti-ship cruise missiles and their proliferation, 
however, a response at the military level may not be sufficient to counter a strategy that 
employs anti-access or area denial capabilities. The increased range of A2/AD 
capabilities threatens a much larger number of states, both on land and at sea, than has 
been historically possible. As a result, potential users of an anti-access or area denial 
strategies are capable of threatening military retaliation against any state that might 
provide access to a perceived competitor (i.e., China could threaten to strike military 
bases in Southeast Asia if states continue to grant U.S. access). In light of such a threat, a 
                                                 
2 Dunford et al, A Cooperative Strategy, 2. 
3 For example, see: Robert C. Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” Naval War College 
Review 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009); Bryan C. McGrath, “On the $uperfluous Carrier,” Information 
Dissemination, last modified May 6, 2011. http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/05/on-uperflous-
carrier.html; and Henry J. Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Washington, DC: Center for a New American 
Security, 2013). 
 3 
counter-strategy may require the United States to promise more than a military guarantee. 
Building an effective maritime strategy and counter- strategy may require a combination 
of efforts spanning the various levels of political power: diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic. With that in mind, any decision to change the current fleet 
structure ought to consider the role the navy plays across all levels of power.  
Since World War II, the aircraft carrier has played a significant role in U.S. 
maritime strategy. The size and cost of aircraft carriers serve as a diplomatic symbol of a 
state’s economic strength. Their size and capabilities provide a means of delivering 
substantial military power while also serving as a platform for intelligence gathering. 
Finally, their facilities and adaptability allow them to adjust from a military role to a 
humanitarian one as seen in recent disaster responses. This thesis will analyze the role 
current aircraft carriers and their strike groups play across the various levels of power in 
executing national maritime strategy, and evaluate whether their strategic impact 
outweighs the operational risk of operating within an A2/AD environment. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The phrase “anti-access/area denial” has implications on the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels. Military analysts Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work 
separate the terms based on strategic versus operational levels. Conceptually, they argue, 
“anti-access” is a strategy intended to prevent another’s forces from entering into a 
theater of operations, whereas “area denial” is the operationalized prevention of one’s 
“freedom of action” in an area under the defender’s control.4  
Another way of discerning between the two concepts is in terms of tactical 
“actions and capabilities.” The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access 
Concept (JOAC) describes anti-access actions and capabilities as “usually long-range, 
designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area.”5 Conversely, 
                                                 
4 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area Denial 
Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), ii. 
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2012), 6. 
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the JOAC deems area denial as “usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an 
opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area.”6 
Both Krepinevich et al.’s and the JOAC’s definition agree that there is a 
distinction in the range, or scope, between anti-access and area denial, but the variation in 
their definitions highlights the second issue in defining “anti-access/area denial”: is it 
merely a description of a capability, or a strategic concept with military and political 
objectives? It is necessary to discern between these two, as they have differing 
implications on the current and future role of the aircraft carrier. 
1. Strategic Responses to A2/AD 
Although there is a large supply of capabilities-based assessments and analyses of 
other states’ military doctrines in an effort to predict how they might employ A2/AD 
capabilities, very few attempt to address the strategies behind A2/AD from an historical 
perspective. Sam Tangredi’s seminal work, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD 
Strategies purports that states have employed the strategic concepts behind A2/AD since 
the Persian War of 480 BC. In his analysis of several historic case studies, Tangredi notes 
that a majority of the successful counter-strategies relied on one’s superior maritime 
power. Interestingly, Tangredi’s analysis also demonstrates that, although anti-access 
technological developments change the range and scope of the A2/AD threat, new 
capabilities like anti-ship cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles are merely 
evolutionary, not revolutionary, changes in A2/AD strategy. Rather than rely on 
technological advancements to restore or ensure access, Tangredi argues, a successful 
approach to countering A2/AD must encompass a “whole of government” response while 
understanding any military response will require the combined use of air, land, and sea 
power.7 
While Tangredi cogently argues the importance of a combined effort between 
U.S. political and military power to counter A2/AD strategies, Gary Weir and Sandra J. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 7. 
7 Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2013), 79–83. 
 5 
Doyle stress the importance of an international alliances and cooperation in maritime 
strategy.8 Weir and Doyle’s work provides a historical account of the important roles 
maritime coalitions have played in maintaining maritime security and ensuring open 
access to the commons from 1991 through 2003. One interesting characteristic of Weir 
and Doyle’s research, though not necessarily intentional, is how the majority of their 
examples of maritime cooperation revolve around the supporting or defending of 
coalition aircraft carriers to achieve operational objectives. 
Expanding on Tangredi’s recommendation for joint military response to the 
A2/AD challenge, Aaron Freidberg’s Beyond Air-Sea Battle examines the operational 
concept of Air-Sea Battle (ASB) from an operational and strategic perspective. In his 
analysis of ASB, Freidberg describes the operational concept as relying heavily on naval 
and air power to disrupt, defeat, and destroy an opponent’s A2/AD capabilities, all at the 
expense of ground forces.9 Friedberg further analyzes the role of ASB from a strategic 
standpoint in an effort to assess the military and political outcomes of a hypothetical 
Sino-American conflict, and contrasts the ASB’s direct approach with other indirect 
approaches such as distant blockades or mine warfare. Whether the United States chooses 
to employ a direct approach towards A2/AD as proposed by the Air-Sea Battle concept, 
or an indirect approach of various escalatory steps, Freidberg concludes that a U.S. 
counter-strategy to A2/AD must: reduce U.S. military vulnerability; maintain the threat 
of blockade in a protracted conflict; and develop offensive options. An example of such a 
strategy would be one that improves active and passive defenses, improves long-range 
strike and undersea warfare capabilities, and seeks out opportunities for allied support.10 
2. A2/AD and the Aircraft Carrier 
Understanding the strategic objectives behind the use of A2/AD capabilities, and 
how the United States might respond across diplomatic, informational, military, and 
                                                 
8 Gary E. Weir and Sandra J. Doyle, eds., You Cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations of 
the Royal Australian Navy, Canadian Navy, and United States Navy, 1991–2003, Department of the Navy, 
(Washington, DC, 2013).  
9 Aaron Freidberg Beyond Air-sea Battle: The Debate over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 78–80. 
10 Ibid., 133–149. 
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economic levels of power, is a critical starting point in addressing how A2/AD strategies 
affect the role of the aircraft carrier. Additionally, deciding on the degree to which a 
military response will rely on the carrier’s striking power also affects how one might 
view the viability of the aircraft carrier in a contested area. In summarizing the current 
debate about how current and future A2/AD capabilities impact the role the aircraft 
carrier, one can look to the works of three of the debate’s predominant participants: 
Henry J. Hendrix, Bryan McGrath, and Robert C. Rubel. 
In assessing how A2/AD capabilities affect the strategic value of aircraft carriers, 
retired Navy Capt. Henry J. Hendrix concludes that the United States has created a 
military asset that is so powerful, so large, and so expensive, that the United States can no 
longer afford to lose one. Hendrix focuses on how technological advancements in missile 
range and targeting capabilities have pushed aircraft carriers into operating at ever-
increasing ranges and, when combined with the shrinking operating range of modern 
carrier air wings, that aircraft carriers no longer provide the military benefit they did in 
the past.11 Hendrix urges the Navy to take the A2/AD threat as an opportunity to “slowly 
divest” from aircraft carriers while simultaneously shifting its financial investments into 
unmanned strike capabilities like the “unmanned combat air vehicle” (UCAV).12 Such a 
shift in mindset and investment would eventually make way for the Navy to pursue a new 
fleet force structure centered around a new platform, possibly a Tomahawk-laden 
submarine or arsenal ship, that can provide greater striking power at decreased 
operational risk.13 
Bryan McGrath, also a retired naval officer, reaches a less pessimistic conclusion 
regarding the aircraft carrier’s future utility, and cautions that a final decision must not 
lose sight of the United States’ global maritime strategy. In McGrath’s view, Hendrix 
correctly assess how modern anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles have 
                                                 
11 These topics are the focus of both Hendrix’s report At What Cost a Carrier? and his follow-up 
report: Retreat from Range: The Rise and Fall of Carrier Aviation, (Washington DC: Center for a New 
American Security, 2013). 




significantly decreased the utility of the aircraft carrier’s air wing, but McGrath contends 
that Hendrix extends the conclusion too far by suggesting the necessary step is to 
abandon the aircraft carrier and the carrier strike group model.14 Rather, McGrath argues 
that improving the air wing through new platforms with longer range will buoy the 
aircraft carrier back into a position of importance.15 McGrath extends the debate further 
by addressing the aircraft carrier’s role in the Navy’s current maritime strategy. In 
evaluating the current strategic environment in relation to the Navy’s 2007 decision to 
decrease its carrier fleet from 12 to 11, McGrath et al. conclude that the Navy actually 
requires more aircraft carriers to provide operational commanders greater flexibility and 
resources in meeting their strategic objectives of global sea control, power projection, and 
crisis response.16  
Whereas Hendrix bases his perspective on the carrier debate on the tactical and 
operational implications, and McGrath on the tactical-strategic effects, Robert C. Rubel 
shifts the carrier debate to how changes in strategy demand changes in force structure. 
Rubel argues that, before the Navy can decide how to proceed with the future of the 
aircraft carrier program, it must first recognize that the current geo-political climate and 
the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower require a paradigm shift in general 
force structure planning.17 Following the end of the Cold War, the Navy has enjoyed a 
period of freedom from any near-peer naval competitors. The freedom to maneuver into a 
battle space uncontested resulted in the Navy focusing its efforts on using aircraft carriers 
mainly as political chess pieces—symbols of American military might—and airbases at 
sea capable of delivering striking power to a battle space “from the sea.” Rather than 
attempting to scale up the current system—which is designed around maintaining two 
major hubs: the Middle East and the Western Pacific—centered around post-Cold War 
                                                 
14 Bryan C. McGrath, “On the $uperfluous Carrier,” Information Dissemination, last modified May 6, 
2011, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/05/on-uperflous-carrier.html.  
15 McGrath, “On the $uperfluous Carrier.” 
16 Seth Cropsey, Bryan C. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton, Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the 
Joint Force, and High-End Conflict (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2015), 91–99. 
17 Robert C. Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 
(Spring 2009), 13. 
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carrier strike groups, Rubel contends that the current environment of non-state actors and 
near-peer naval powers requires a new naval model.18  
Rubel’s proposed new naval force would center around four principal segments: a 
missile-centric “access generation” force, a carrier-centric “power projection” force, a 
constabulary “maritime security” force, and a group of maritime operations centers 
(MOCs) focused on information operations.19 This model allows the Navy to tailor its 
force structure based on which segment or segments it needs more of to meet national 
strategic objectives. According to Rubel, the present geo-strategic environment, for 
example, calls for a navy with increased “access generation” and “maritime security” 
forces while maintaining the “projection forces” at the present level. Rubel does not 
discount the value of the aircraft carrier in future scenarios. Instead, he contends that 
present A2/AD capabilities demand the Navy consider shifting the aircraft carrier from 
the predominant striking force of the fleet back to its earlier roll of serving as the “eyes of 
the fleet,” using its current and future air wings to provide maritime domain awareness.20 
Rubel does not rule out the possibility of the aircraft carrier eventually returning to other 
previous doctrinal roles in naval strategy, but cautions that such a transition will require 
technological improvements in order to permit their operation in A2/AD environments at 
reduced risk.21  
3. The Way Forward 
Answering the question of the aircraft carrier’s current and future relevance 
requires more than a tactical level of analysis. Any shift in the procurement plan of future 
aircraft carriers or in their operational employment will significantly impact the resources 
and capabilities available for operational commanders to meet current and future national 
strategic requirements. Similarly, any adjustment in national strategy will require the 
Navy to consider if its current force structure is capable of or appropriate for meeting its 
                                                 
18 Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” 13. 
19 Ibid., 18–19. 
20 Robert C. Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft Carriers,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 
(Autumn 2011), 22–24. 
21 Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft Carriers,” 26–27. 
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objectives. As evidenced in the reviewed literature, the current debate has historical 
parallels both in operational adjustments and improvements in ship capabilities. By 
analyzing these historical interactions, this thesis will attempt to provide 
recommendations for how the Navy should proceed in answering the current A2/AD 
concerns while considering how any response will impact its global maritime strategy. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The aircraft carrier has remained a valuable piece of U.S. naval power since the 
commissioning of the USS Langley in 1922, and became the central component of U.S. 
maritime strategy following World War II, surviving multiple debates over its 
survivability, affordability, and adaptability. Answering the question over the future role 
of the aircraft carrier in U.S. maritime strategy requires first answering several other 
questions. First, what is the current objective of U.S. maritime strategy? Second, what are 
the implications of A2/AD capabilities on U.S. maritime strategy? Third, can the aircraft 
carrier’s role in current and alternative maritime strategies be fulfilled by another 
platform or combination of platforms? Fourth, can the aircraft carrier adapt to overcome 
the restrictions of an A2/AD environment? 
Considering the contents of the latest Cooperative Strategy, one can discern the 
current objectives of U.S. maritime strategy: maintaining the ability for the United States 
military to establish sea control in any region of its choosing. A secondary objective of 
the national maritime strategy is to capitalize on foreign partners and allies to conduct 
constabulary operations to ensure the free flow of international trade. 
In determining the role of the aircraft carrier in current maritime strategy, one can 
again look to stated policies in national strategy publications and Congressional 
testimonies, especially those of Naval leadership responsible for procurement and 
strategy. Review of these sources shows a high desire for aircraft carriers because of their 
ability to escalate their roles across a spectrum of military and non-military scenarios. 
This helps to answer the third question: whether or not a different platform or a collection 
of platforms can provide the same or better solution. While such a solution may be 
 10 
possible, it will require financial investment both in new platforms and necessary support 
capacity. 
After identifying the current maritime strategic objectives and identifying the 
current role the aircraft carrier plays within the maritime strategy, one can reach three 
possible conclusions based on the impact of operating within an A2/AD environment. 
One option is that A2/AD strategies may simply force the Navy to adjust the striking 
capability of the aircraft carrier—namely, the air wing—thereby allowing the carrier 
strike group to operate as normal. A second option is that A2/AD strategies affect the 
entire naval fleet model, thereby requiring an entirely new approach to how the United 
States projects and delivers its military power. A third possible conclusion is that the 
United States may need to reconsider its maritime strategic objectives in light of what it 
can accomplish in the face of an A2/AD threat, and choose to cede its global sea control 
objectives for smaller, local sea control in specific theaters. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis centers on a historical case study of two periods in which the United 
States and its carrier fleet faced some degree of anti-access or area denial threat to its 
maritime strategy: Imperial Japan in the Pacific theater in World War II, and the Soviet 
maritime reconnaissance-strike complex threat during the Cold War. The purpose of 
these cases is twofold: first, to identify the similarity between contemporary and past 
challenges; second, to examine how the Navy pursued innovative operational solutions 
regarding the use of its aircraft carriers to counter strategic challenges. 
After establishing a historical comparison between the case studies and the 
present debate, this thesis turns to the proposed recommendations from the current 
literature regarding the aircraft carrier’s capabilities, its shortfalls, and proposed 
alternative ship-types or roles for the aircraft carrier. The analysis of each 
recommendation centers on: how it addresses the A2/AD challenge, what it proposes for 
the role of the aircraft carrier, and the viability of its recommendation. Finally, the 
conclusion attempts to make a general recommendation on force structure considerations, 
while highlighting areas for future debate and research.  
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II. PAST AS PROLOGUE 
Military technological advancements have begun to threaten the United States’ 
sea power, specifically by challenging its ability to assert local sea control and project 
power ashore. Additionally, these technological advancements are changing the nature of 
sea power: ships upon the sea are at increasingly greater risk from space-based targeting 
systems and land-based anti-access/area denial systems. The effect of such developments, 
as David C. Gompert points out, is a shift in “the balance between defense and offense at 
sea in favor of the former, making (sea) control harder and (sea) denial easier.”22  
The United States has faced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges in the 
past, and examining these previous experiences provides valuable lessons for possible 
ways forward. Imperial Japan’s use of land-based bombers and kamikazes, and the Soviet 
Union’s maritime strike-reconnaissance complex closely parallel the current threats of 
shore-based strike systems. In both of these situations, the United States sought 
technological and operational solutions to the threats against its ability to assert sea 
control and project power ashore. Additionally, these previous approaches demonstrate 
the vital role aircraft carriers, their air wings, and the carrier battle group as a whole 
played in U.S. maritime strategy. The parallels between these case studies and the 
contemporary debate over the efficacy of the aircraft carrier in an A2/AD environment 
provide valuable lessons for alternative methods in how the United States can operate its 
forces while still achieving its desired ends: power projection and sea control. 
A. CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 
The United States currently faces several technological threats to its ability to 
establish and maintain sea control. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and China have 
pursued military developments in ship-to-ship missiles, mines, land-based fighter and 
bomber aircraft, surface ships and submarines, and unmanned aerial vehicles. While 
technological advancements in these systems have improved their range, speed, and 
                                                 
22 David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2013), 7. 
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effectiveness, they represent evolutionary improvements of previous anti-access and area 
denial capabilities. Additionally, these technological advancements are changing the 
nature of sea power: ships upon the sea are at increasingly greater risk from space-based 
targeting systems and land-based anti-access/area denial systems. One particular trend, 
however, poses a revolutionary strategic challenge to how the United States can maintain 
its power projection and sea control capabilities: the use of land-based systems to conduct 
sea denial.   
1. CHINESE LAND-BASED CAPABILITIES 
China’s recent military modernization efforts, and its specific interest in A2/AD 
capabilities, stem largely from its experience during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In an 
effort to influence Taiwan’s first free election, China conducted several missile tests 
aimed in Taiwan’s proximity. In response to China’s actions, the United States–under 
President Clinton–ordered two carrier battle groups to sail between China and Taiwan in 
an effort to deter Chinese actions and deescalate regional tension.23 The United States’ 
actions awakened the Chinese to their inability to counter U.S. power projection 
capabilities. To this end, several military analysts believe China’s objective behind the 
buildup has been to challenge the United States’ ability to project power and influence 
within the region.24 Thus, a critical component of China’s military modernization has 
been long-range asymmetric weapons systems capable of threatening U.S. forward bases 
and ships within the Pacific.  
Since 1996, China has conducted both qualitative and quantitative improvements 
on the Second Artillery’s ballistic missile force. Improvements in DF-15 and DF-11 
missile guidance systems have reduced their circular error probable (CEP) from 600 
meters to between five to ten meters.25 Additionally, China’s inventory of short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) increased from only a mere handful in the 1980s to 
                                                 
23 Freidberg Beyond Air-sea Battle, 12. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 47. 
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approximately 1,200 by 2015.26 Between the range of China’s various short, medium, 
and long-range ballistic missiles, and their significantly improved accuracy, China is 
capable of threatening nearly every U.S. forward base within the Pacific area of 
operations.  
For the past several years, China has deployed a land-based ballistic missile 
designed to target surface ships at ranges exceeding 900 nm. Through the use of a broad-
area maritime surveillance and targeting system, and armed with a maneuverable reentry 
vehicle (MaRV), the DF-21D ASBM is capable of threatening U.S. aircraft carriers or 
other allied ships within Pacific region.27 Presently, the United States lacks a weapon 
system capable of striking China’s mobile ASBMs while also avoiding the other 
components of its layered A2/AD capabilities.28 
A 2007 RAND report details the implications of these capabilities based on four 
categories: attacks on forward airbases; attacks on command and control (C2) 
infrastructure, attacks on logistical support functions, and attacks on aircraft carriers.29 
First, by targeting U.S. airfields, China could destroy aerial refueling aircraft—a critical 
resource if aircraft carriers are forced to operate at long range–early-warning aircraft, and 
long-range bombers. Second, were China to attack U.S. C2 systems, it could also disrupt 
the coordination of any counter-attack. Third, targeting U.S. logistics support would 
similarly disrupt a U.S. response by preventing the movement or re-supply of troops and 
equipment. Finally, attacking an aircraft carrier at sea builds upon the potential loss of 
forward air bases and targets the final potential supplier of U.S. air power. Considering 
the vital role air superiority has played in the U.S. way of war for the past two decades, 
the potential loss of this capability could force the United States into avoiding a conflict 
altogether. 
                                                 
26 Heginbotham, “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard,” 47. 
27 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities–
Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL33153, May 31, 2016, 9. 
28 For a broad discussion on the range of Chinese A2/AD capabilities, see O’Rourke, “China Naval 
Modernization” (2016). 
29 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the 
Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, 
CA.: RAND, 2007), 81. 
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China’s modernization efforts since the Taiwan Crisis have significantly 
increased its ability to challenge the United States’ forward presence, and its ability to 
operate power projection forces within the region. Perhaps the most significant impact of 
these capabilities, however, has been on U.S. strategy. 
2. STRATEGIC IMPACT 
The current U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, states two of the Navy’s essential functions include “all domain access, 
deterrence, sea control and power projection.”30  It goes on to describe the purpose of 
these functions is to establish “local maritime superiority while denying an adversary the 
same ability” in order to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, 
protect vital sea lanes, and affect operations on the land.31  Executing these functions, the 
Cooperative Strategy argues, enables the United States to “defeat aggression, respond to 
crises, and strengthen partnerships,” achieving what Alfred Thayer Mahan might consider 
exercising “international influence.”32   
Land-based A2/AD capabilities specifically target the components of U.S. power 
projection and sea power, threatening their ability to achieve their functions, and thereby 
jeopardizing the United States’ ability to achieve its desired ends. Specifically, China’s 
A2/AD capabilities pose five major strategic implications for the United States and the 
Pacific region.33 First, their range and precision increases the vulnerability of U.S. 
forward bases and ships at sea. Second, the threat of their use raises the potential cost—in 
blood and treasure—of U.S. intervention in a regional confrontation. Third, as China’s 
capabilities increase relative to the United States’ ability to counter them, they call into 
question the credibility of U.S. security guarantees to its regional allies and partners. 
Fourth, the asymmetric financial benefit of investing in affordable land-based missiles 
                                                 
30 Dunford, et al., A Cooperative Strategy, 19 
31 Ibid., 22-24 
32 Ibid., 35 
33 Aaron Freidberg, "Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over U.S. Military Strategy in Asia," 
YouTube video, 10:00, International Institute for Strategic Studies, published June 11, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tkVqH9ii14.  
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over capital-intensive warships places the United States at a financial disadvantage, as it 
will have to invest much more financially to maintain its relative position than China will 
to dislodge it. Finally, as China’s capabilities increase, so too might its confidence in its 
ability to credibly deter U.S. intervention. Should China overestimate its deterrent ability, 
it is possible that China could miscalculate U.S. interests in a given scenario, and thereby 
fall into the very conflict it had attempted to avoid.   
In light of these strategic implications, the following section examines some of 
the previous ways in which the United States alleviated similar concerns. The World War 
II example addresses how the United States mitigated the risk of deploying its aircraft 
carriers within range of Imperial Japan’s capabilities in order to support operations on the 
land. The Cold War example provides a valuable lesson as it addresses the U.S. response 
challenge against its regional security guarantees. Additionally, it demonstrates how the 
United States employed existing capabilities in innovative ways without pursuing 
financially burdensome technical capabilities. 
B. LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
Anti-access and area denial weapons systems directly challenge the United States’ 
ability to gain or exercise command of the sea, whether for commercial or military use, 
potentially limiting its international influence or its ability to pursue broader national 
objectives. Specifically, A2/AD capabilities can prevent the fleet from maneuvering into 
or operating within a specific region, force it to operate beyond its preferred range, and in 
turn deny or degrade its ability to support other military operations. In previous iterations 
of A2/AD challenges, U.S. opponents focused on sea denial, preventing the United States 
the use of its naval advantage. Technological improvements, however, have opened the 
door for states to use their A2/AD capabilities in new ways. By capitalizing on the 
improvements in range and targeting, for example, it is possible that a state with 
sufficient weaponry could use its land-based systems to gain and exercise its own 
command of the sea, if only in a local area or for only a temporary amount of time.34  
                                                 
34 For more discussion of this concept in regards to China, see Andrew S. Erickson and David D. 
Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Seas: Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” 
Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn, 2009), 53–86. 
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The following section will examine how Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union 
sought to use various sea- and land-based anti-access/area denial technologies to oppose 
U.S. sea control and power projection, and how the United States responded both 
technologically and operationally. The discussion will then turn to the present A2/AD 
challenges the United States faces, specifically those in the Pacific region. 
1. Imperial Japan and WWII  
One of Japan’s strategic objectives in the Pacific was to deter U.S. interference 
against Japan’s military and political pursuits. Sam Tangredi illustrates this point in his 
analysis of historical A2/AD strategies:  
[Japan’s] strike at Pearl Harbor was not intended as a prelude to an 
invasion of Hawaii or the continental United States, but to knock over the 
chessboard so that the Americans would decide that—as far as the Asia-
Pacific region was concerned—it was too costly to put their pieces back 
into the game. This constitutes a classic anti-access approach.35 
Thus, in order for the United States to achieve its political objectives of Japan’s 
unconditional surrender, it had to first defeat Japan’s anti-access and area denial 
capabilities. 
Following the agreements of the London Naval Treaty, Japan tied its fleet size to 
a three-fifths ratio of its U.S. and British counterparts. Ostensibly, this meant that in the 
event of a conflict between the parties, Japan would be fighting from a weakened 
position, both in terms of numbers and tonnage. In order to offset this disadvantage, 
Japan utilized its geographic advantage and technological improvements to inflict 
asymmetric damage on its militarily superior opponents.36  
Geography played a significant role in Japan’s strategy. Whereas the United 
States had to transport its fleet, troops, and supplies across the Pacific Ocean and into the 
theater, the Japanese benefited from significantly shorter sea lines of communication. The 
                                                 
35 Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, 2–3. 
36 Toshi Yoshihara, “Anti-Access in Comparative Perspective: Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and 
21st-Century China,” in National Institute of Defense Studies, “History of the Joint and Combined 
Operations,” (September 17, 2014), last accessed May 27, 2016, 
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operational factor of space played into Japan’s advantage as the distance the United 
States had to travel in order to reach the Pacific theater allowed Japan the opportunity to 
strike U.S. convoys multiple times, whittling away at U.S. ships and supplies, in a sort of 
Fabian strategy, before finally reaching Japan’s battle fleets.37  
Technological advancements, namely in the development and use of air power 
also supported Japan’s anti-access/area denial strategy. Japan utilized sea-based air power 
and multi-carrier operations to attack U.S. power projection and sea control. The surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor and the destruction of the U.S. battleships demonstrated that 
coordinated strikes from multiple aircraft carriers were capable of inflicting massive 
damage on an enemy fleet. With the loss of its battleships, the United States suffered a 
temporary loss in its power projection and sea control capabilities until it exercised an 
innovative alternative in the form of its own aircraft carriers. 
Similarly, Japan’s land-based airpower proved important in administering 
asymmetric costs on U.S. and allied sea power. Using forward deployed bases throughout 
the Pacific, Japan used long-range bombers, such as the Mitsubishi G3M and G4M, to 
conduct strikes against U.S. and allied fleets as part of its strategic defensive.38 Japan 
demonstrated the destructive power and operational influence of land-based air over sea 
control in its destruction of the British naval squadron, Force Z, on December 10, 1941. 
The British squadron, lacking air cover, was unable to defend against the bombers, 
resulting in the sinking of two British capital ships—the battleship HMS Prince of Wales 
and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse—in the South China Sea. 
The most infamous use of Japanese air power to deny U.S. maritime operations 
was the use of kamikazes. Initially, bomb-laden Zeke and other frontline aircraft 
constituted Japan’s variation on “precision-guided” munitions. Shortly after the Battle of 
Leyte Gulf, Japan eventually developed new platforms—such as the Oka, or “Cherry 
                                                 
37 A Fabian strategy is a war policy of indirect approach wherein a weaker force avoids decisive 
battles with the enemy and creates delay in a war of attrition until the weaker force can deliver a decisive 
blow at a time and place of its choosing. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New 
Delhi Pentagon Press, 2012), 31. 
38 Toshi Yoshihara, “Anti-Access Lessons from the Past,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 
12 (December 2013): last accessed, October 15, 2015, http://www.usni.org/print/28403. 
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Blossom”—specifically designed for the suicide mission. Japanese land-based bombers 
carried the Oka and released the manned rocket within range of the enemy fleet, allowing 
the Oka’s pilot to target and strike allied warships. Kamikaze pilots targeted U.S. and 
allied carriers, but they achieved their most destructive results when striking the lightly 
armored picket line destroyers.39 Between 1944 and 1945, Japan conducted nearly 2,800 
kamikaze attacks, and sank or damaged more than 100 ships during the battle for 
Okinawa alone.40 
a. U.S. Response 
As the U.S. fleet faced increasing losses as a result of Japanese bombers and 
kamikazes, it turned to the adaptability of the aircraft carrier to help turn the tide. Aircraft 
carriers transitioned from a scouting role to a more offensive configuration. The 
increased size and improvements in armor of the Essex-class carriers over the earlier 
Yorktown-class allowed an increase in air wing size and composition, and improved the 
carriers’ survivability. The carriers’ air wings increased the American fleet’s maritime 
domain awareness, allowing the fleets to detect enemy ships well beyond visual range. 
Additionally, the air wings’ torpedo and dive bombers brought devastating results against 
Japan’s surface ships, and helped turn the tide of the war in the Pacific. 
During the fight against the Japanese fleet for sea control, U.S. carrier air wings 
consisted primarily of dive and torpedo bombers.41 In order to defend against the 
Japanese aerial assaults and establish air superiority, American carriers adapted their air 
wings to the new threat by shifting towards a larger mix of fighter aircraft. Additionally, 
rather than wait to attack the Japanese aircraft in the skies over U.S. forces, carriers began 
operating closer to shore in order to allow their air wings to strike the kamikazes and 
bombers on the ground, and destroy the airfields from which they operated. This 
                                                 
39 For a detailed chronicle of the kamikaze program, see Robin L. Rielly’s Kamikaze Attacks of World 
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41 Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking: The Case 
for Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment, 2008), 30. 
 19 
methodology required carriers to accept higher risk by operating within range of Japanese 
aircraft, but it provided the benefit of striking the Japanese threat at its source, embodying 
the now common idea of “shooting the archer and not the arrows.” 
The United States’ experiences in the Cold War against the Soviet Union’s 
maritime reconnaissance-strike complex nearly forty years after World War II builds 
upon these lessons and serves a valuable example of the possible challenges the United 
States may face against contemporary systems.  
2. Soviet Union and the Cold War 
Where the U.S. experience during World War II describes how one can respond 
to an A2/AD threat in the midst of conflict, the example of the U.S. response to the 
Soviet Union’s capabilities demonstrates important considerations in a non-combat 
environment. Although the Soviet Union was primarily a continental power whose naval 
fleet could not directly challenge U.S. naval supremacy, it possessed a range of 
capabilities that contested the United States’ ability to project power ashore.42 
Specifically, Soviet capabilities threatened to create a virtual no-go zone for U.S. and 
NATO forces within the Mediterranean, forcing the United States to develop innovative 
operational and tactical solutions in order to maintain its forward presence and influence 
within the region.43 
The strategic objective of Soviet containment drove the United States to maintain 
a forward presence in order to deter Soviet expansion and assure its allies of U.S. 
assistance in the event of a crisis. Part of the United States’ security guarantee relied on 
its ability to conduct conventional and nuclear strikes against Soviet targets in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the naval bastions north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 
(GIUK) gap. Limited by the striking range of the air wings aboard the Midway-class 
aircraft carriers, American ships would have to operate within range of Soviet submarines 
and shore-based aircraft. To obviate these risks, U.S. Navy leadership sought innovative 
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operational approaches to permit the carrier strike groups to maneuver within range, 
deploy and recover its strike aircraft, and exit the Soviet engagement envelope while 
minimizing or eliminating the Soviet Union’s ability to locate or attack them.44 The 
HAYSTACK operational concepts of the 1950s focused on the use of dispersed 
operations and emissions control (EMCON) conditions in order to restore American 
carrier strike groups’ freedom of maneuver against the Soviets A2/AD capabilities.  
Haystack’s central concept was to “thwart and delay” the detection of the aircraft 
carriers.45 To do so, it recommended that the strike group should “disperse widely and 
intermingle with commercial shipping in order to eliminate the unmistakable appearance 
on airborne radar scopes of the standard close, circular (‘bulls-eye’) formation.”46 As the 
Haystack experiments progressed, the results demonstrated the importance of combining 
disciplined EMCON conditions with dispersed operations in order to prevent Soviet 
electronic countermeasure (ECM) aircraft from detecting and homing in on U.S. radars or 
navigational aids. By dispersing the carrier strike groups and masking or limiting its 
electronic signatures, the Haystack experiments increased the strike groups’ time to 
detection, and subsequently its survival time, from less than two hours to at least eight 
hours, significantly restoring some of the strike groups’ ability to fulfill its power 
projection role.47 
There is a truism in strategy that cautions, “the enemy gets a vote.” While the 
Haystack experiments helped the United States develop a means of countering Soviet 
detection, the Soviet Navy deployed wide-area sensor capabilities to improve its 
detection capabilities. Through the fusing of its space-based Radar Ocean 
Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) and other sources into the Soviet Ocean 
Surveillance System (SOSS), the Soviet Union could again locate and track American 
warships, and direct its long-range, supersonic Tu-22 Backfire bombers within range to 
deploy their anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The Soviets also employed a strategic 
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defensive of concentric rings around its naval bastions. Within the inner ring, the Soviets 
utilized surface ships and submarines armed with ASCMs to maintain sea control. 
Conversely, between the outer and inner rings, the Soviet Union focused on sea denial 
using its long-range bombers and ASCMs, forcing the U.S. fleets to operate beyond the 
range of their strike aircraft and Tomahawk missiles. 
In light of the Soviet defensive strategy, the United States combined its lessons 
from the Haystack experiments and its experience in World War II. The goal was to 
maneuver the carrier strike groups within range of its targets, undetected, while using air 
patrols and picket ships to again “shoot the archers” (Soviet bombers) before they could 
deploy their missiles. Fortunately, neither the Soviets nor the United States had an 
opportunity to test their strategies against the other; however, several U.S. military 
leaders during that period contend that the United States’ offensive approach was 
controversial and could have possibly forced the Soviets to employ nuclear weapons.48 
This potential threat of escalating a conflict to nuclear war provides an important lesson 
when considering how to respond to a nuclear state’s A2/AD capabilities, such as China. 
3. Lessons Learned 
Examining the U.S. response to Japanese and Soviet A2/AD efforts provides 
several lessons that are applicable for today’s concerns. First, countering Japan’s anti-
access strategy was costly both in time and materiel. The U.S. naval campaign in the 
Pacific lasted more than forty months and more than 700 ships were lost.49 The United 
States must consider the costs it is willing to bear in countering contemporary challenges 
in terms of time, materiel, and its capacity to rebuild. 
Another lesson for the United States is that no single platform or technology will 
secure the objective; it requires both a fleet-wide and joint response. Aircraft carriers and 
their air wings were vital in destroying Japanese ships and provided the final blows 
against the kamikaze threat. Similarly, the air wings during the Cold War were central in 
                                                 
48 Ehrhard and Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking, 89. 
49 Beginning with the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 4, 1942 and ending with Japan’s surrender on 
September 2, 1945. 
 22 
the nuclear targeting plans against the Soviet Union. In neither case were the carriers 
capable of performing their tasks alone, however. Picket lines of destroyers and cruisers 
provided the defensive screens that were critical in limiting the Japanese bombers’ and 
kamikazes’ effectiveness once in range of the fleet, and in providing counter-air defenses 
against Soviet bombers. 
The United States must also consider the importance of survivability and 
adaptability. Small and lightly armored ships constituted the greatest number of ships 
destroyed by kamikaze aircraft, whereas the larger and more heavily armored aircraft 
carriers proved more survivable. It is interesting to note that British carriers suffered far 
less damage than their U.S. counterparts during these attacks. The main reason for such a 
difference was in the materials used in both countries’ flight deck construction–the 
British using steel as opposed to the Americans’ wooden decks.50 Flight decks 
notwithstanding, larger ships allowed for more survivable construction techniques, 
enabling them to stay in the fight longer, or to return shortly after being repaired.51 The 
success of the aircraft carriers also demonstrates the importance of adaptable payloads. 
Aircraft carriers were able to adjust their air wing compositions as necessary to fit the 
operational circumstances, helping to first defend against the kamikaze “arrows” and then 
eventually striking their airfields, or “archers.” Adaptability in a ship’s payload allows a 
state to account for variation in the threat situation or changes in the objective. 
Closely tied with the idea of adaptable payloads is the requirement to have 
alternative payloads readily available. The larger aircraft carriers were able to adjust their 
air wings only because smaller escort and fast carriers were nearby carrying the spare 
aircraft. Also, considering A2/AD strategies seek to attrite an adversary’s force, it is 
critical that the United States be able to replenish or replace the forces lost during a 
campaign. 
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C. APPLICABILITY OF CASE STUDIES 
Imperial Japan’s and the Soviet Union’s pursuit of asymmetric means to inflict 
high cost against the United States–in terms of both blood and treasure–is in direct line 
with the general principle of anti-access and area denial strategies.52 Additionally, the use 
of land-based aircraft to attack U.S. and allied sea power serves as a useful parallel to the 
current A2/AD environment. First, land-based aircraft do not need to operate within the 
size limitations of their sea-based counterparts, allowing for increased size, range, and 
ordnance. The range advantage of Japanese and Soviet bombers over American sea-based 
air power forced U.S. carriers to choose between operating further from their targets at a 
decreased efficiency, or accepting higher levels of risk by operating closer to shore and 
within range of enemy aircraft. The current Nimitz and Ford-class carriers face a similar 
challenge considering their air wings’ average unrefueld range of 496 nautical miles is 
within engagement zone of several anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) systems.53 
Another parallel between these case studies and contemporary concerns is that of 
precision guidance systems. The individual pilots conducting the kamikaze attacks 
identified and selected their targets, and flew their manned cruise missiles into their 
targets’ decks. Similarly, advancements in Soviet space-based reconnaissance systems 
and electronic signal detection were critical in locating U.S. ships and directing its sea 
denial forces. China, a modern purveyor of A2/AD capabilities, employs detection and 
targeting systems that have evolved from the Soviet maritime reconnaissance-strike 
complex.  
Imperial Japan’s approach to anti-access/area denial in the final years of the war 
reflected not only the asymmetric impact such capabilities can have against a larger force, 
but also the asymmetric financial costs. Building a fleet of kamikaze pilots and aircraft 
designed for a one-way mission delivered destructive capabilities at much lower costs 
than training fighter pilots or aircraft capable designed for establishing air superiority. 
Similarly, a strategy centered on a battery of ASCMs to affect anti-access or area denial 
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on the sea is considerably less expensive than building the naval ships necessary to 
perform sea control beyond a state’s territorial waters. These points demonstrate that both 
Imperial Japan’s strategy and actions during World War II, and those of the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, have parallels in today’s environment both in their design and 
methodology. All points considered, though, contemporary A2/AD capabilities have 
introduced significant strategic challenges that complicate any potential U.S. response. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As the previous case studies demonstrate, this is not the first time U.S. forces 
have confronted or been outranged by A2/AD systems. Analyzing some of the lessons 
learned from those case studies highlights several technical improvements U.S. forces 
could pursue in order to increase the range of U.S. weapons and strike platforms. 
Additionally, employing innovative operational methods could counter China’s maritime 
surveillance system and provide a valuable window of opportunity for current U.S. 
capabilities to target China’s weapons systems. Recent operational concepts such as Air-
Sea Battle and Offshore Control detail how U.S. forces could utilize joint capabilities in 
the event of a conflict between the United States and an adversary employing similar 
systems as China. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe some of the modern A2/AD 
capabilities, identify their strategic implications, and analyze some of the technological 
and operational approaches the United States has employed against A2/AD strategic 
challenges in the past. The United States’ experiences with Japanese and Soviet A2/AD 
challenges share many similarities with today’s strategic environment. While there are 
valuable tactical and operational lessons for U.S. military leaders to draw upon from 
these case studies, continued advancements in modern land-based systems, and changes 




III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze whether the capabilities that the current 
Ford class and other super carriers provide justify their continued development and 
employment, or whether alternative systems can provide the same or greater effect at 
lower opportunity costs given the current strategic environment. First, this chapter will 
briefly describe the broader strategic environment and risks the Navy has been operating 
within for the past two decades and the role the aircraft carrier has played in U.S. military 
operations. Next, the chapter will discuss the current challenges to U.S. maritime strategy 
by providing specific examples of modern anti-access/area denial capabilities and how 
they challenge the efficacy of the aircraft carrier and air wing in their current form. The 
chapter will then consider several alternative systems to the aircraft carrier, specifically 
missile-centric surface and subsurface combatants, and air-capable amphibious assault 
ships. Finally, the chapter will present recommendations for a way forward in an effort to 
minimize any remaining capability shortfalls. 
A. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT/RISKS 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. military strategy has enjoyed several 
decades of uncontested access across the various domains–air, sea, land, space, and 
cyberspace. U.S. maritime strategies and force structures have capitalized on this access 
by focusing on delivering rapid and sustainable air power from the sea in order to affect 
or support operations on the shore. The Navy encapsulated these objectives in its strategy 
white papers “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea,” which called for an 
emphasis in operating naval forces in the littoral areas closer to an adversary’s shore. 
Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe’s “From the Sea” strategy described the strategic 
environment:  
Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future 
operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on 
capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the 
“littoral” or coastlines of the earth. With the demise of the Soviet Union, 
the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and 
ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage. As a result, our national 
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maritime policies can afford to de-emphasize efforts in some naval 
warfare areas.54 
Today’s carrier air wing is largely a product of the post-Cold War strategic 
environment. Reflecting the strategic guidance of “…From the Sea” and 
“Forward…From the Sea,” naval strike warfare shifted its focus from long-range fighter 
escorts and nuclear-capable bombers towards short-range multi-purpose platforms and 
increased sortie rates.55 As Naval officials remarked in a Congressional Research Service 
F/A-18E/F program brief, “greater range/payload capabilities…[were] less essential for 
fleet defense with the demise of a Soviet threat.”56  
Aircraft carriers have provided significant advantages to combatant commanders 
during the two decades of uncontested access. These advantages include the ability to 
transport approximately 75 aircraft (including more than 40 strike fighters) across the 
globe in a matter of days or weeks, and the ability to conduct approximately 200 sorties 
per day. Additionally, aircraft carriers have provided combatant commanders with 
scalable and precise firepower that can be used in various levels of conflict and across the 
range of military operations, and the option to deliver these capabilities from 
international waters without the need for negotiating basing rights from other countries. 
The 2006 iteration of Naval Aviation Vision 2020 describes the importance of aircraft 
carriers in military operations since 1998: 
The aircraft carrier is the cornerstone of naval aviation, in the past ten 
years alone, large-deck carriers have been called upon to respond to, and 
engage in, over 20 separate international crises, ranging from deterring 
Iraqi aggression (Operations Northern and Southern Watch) to thwarting 
attacks on civilians in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Operation 
Deliberate Force). In OEF, carrier-based air wings flew strike and combat 
support missions against Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist forces in 
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Afghanistan. In OIF, the carriers operated around-the-clock, immune to 
hazards such as sandstorms that grounded land-based aircraft. Organic air 
wings provided strike, electronic attack, airborne early warning, ISR, and 
other combat capabilities, clearly demonstrating the role of the large-deck 
aircraft carrier as a permanent fixture in our national defense strategy.57 
The contributions of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to military operations since the 
Cold War, however, have been possible mainly due to the aircraft carrier’s freedom to 
move into and within a theater of operations. Unfortunately, the strategic environment is 
transforming in a way that challenges these previous notions of guaranteed, or assured, 
access. 
In 2003, a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report 
identified a rising challenge to U.S. power projection capabilities.58 Specifically, the 
CSBA report cautions that the proliferation of satellite services and missile technology 
would “allow even regional rogue states both to pre-target key fixed facilities and to 
monitor U.S. deployments into forward bases,” thereby jeopardizing the United States’ 
access into a theater—commonly referred to as “anti-access.”59 Additionally, adversary 
capabilities such as “long-range, anti-ship cruise, or even ballistic, missiles, and long-
range submarines” comprise an “area denial” threat, which challenges U.S. freedom to 
maneuver within a theater of operations.60  
Concern over anti-access/area denial capabilities in general, and their implications 
on the efficacy of the aircraft carrier specifically, have grown in parallel with the United 
States’ “re-balancing” to Asia. The geography of the Pacific necessitates a primarily 
naval focus. The most recent U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower, describes the Navy’s vital role in maintaining access to the maritime 
commons for domestic and global economic prosperity.61 As the United States has 
                                                 
57 James M. Zortman, Walter B. Massenburg and Kilkline, Thomas J., Jr, “Naval Aviation Vision 
2020,” Naval Aviation Enterprise, 2006, 
http://depts.washington.edu/uwnrotc/intro/Naval_Aviation_Vision_2020.pdf (accessed April 20, 2016), 36. 
58 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area Denial 
Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003).  
59 Ibid., 4. 
60 Ibid., 5. 
61 Dunford, et al., A Cooperative Strategy, 8. 
 28 
attempted to shift its foreign policy focus towards Asia, it has come to recognize a rising, 
and possibly peer-competitor in China. While the United States and China continue to 
maintain amicable relations, Chinese military advancements have highlighted several 
challenges to the United States’ current methodology for employing its aircraft carriers 
for both sea control and power projection and serve as a benchmark for potential 
capabilities the United States may encounter in future conflicts.62 
Since the 1990s, and specifically after the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China has 
embarked on a broad naval modernization campaign to develop or improve its A2/AD 
capabilities.63 One significant advancement has been China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles 
(ASBMs), such as the DF-21D, which possess the capability of attacking surface ships at 
a range of approximately 1,500 km (nearly 810 nautical miles) and includes a 
maneuverable warhead (MaRV) increasing its ability to strike a moving ship.64 
Combined with a precision guidance network consisting of satellite tracking or over-the-
horizon radar, China’s ASBMs potentially pose a significant anti-access threat to U.S. 
aircraft carriers and other surface vessels, challenging their ability to establish sea control 
or project power ashore.  
China has also developed several area denial capabilities that threaten the United 
States’ ability to maneuver within a theater of operations. The submarine-launched Anti-
Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) SS-N-27B Sizzler, for example, “is specifically designed to 
defeat the U.S. Aegis anti-air warfare system, penetrate a task force’s defenses, and strike 
high-value surface warships, to include carriers.”65 Additionally, China has deployed a 
layered integrated air defense system (IADS) comprised of radars, surface-to-air missiles, 
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and land-based aircraft along its eastern border challenging U.S. air superiority from 
either sea-based or land-based aircraft.66 In short, China’s military advancements 
threaten the United States’ ability to operate its aircraft carriers in the manner it has relied 
upon for the past two decades.  
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The combination of China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities poses a 
significant challenge to the aircraft carrier’s operations within the Pacific. An advanced 
maritime surveillance network and ASBMs threaten the ability to move an aircraft carrier 
into a position to deploy its air wing. If a carrier were to get in position, however, it then 
faces sea- and submarine launched ASCMs while surface-to-air missiles obviate the use 
of the air wing. In light of the potential operational risks aircraft carriers face in a 
contemporary A2/AD environment, several military strategy and force structure experts 
have questioned the efficacy of their continued development, and deployment. These 
recommendations range from divesting from the aircraft carrier as a whole and pursuing 
alternative surface and subsurface ship types, including smaller aircraft carriers, to 
addressing the aircraft carrier’s primary weapon system: its air wing. The following 
section will describe these proposed alternatives and highlight their merits and shortfalls. 
1. Surface and Subsurface Missile Carriers 
One of the primary mission areas for a carrier air wing is strike warfare, or “attack 
to damage or destroy an objective or a capability.”67 In its contemporary use, the term is 
synonymous with the idea of attacking land-based targets, although it can certainly apply 
to sea or undersea vessels as well. Nearly every naval vessel maintains a capability of 
performing some degree of strike warfare, with the difference being in the volume, 
precision, and destructive capacity of their weaponry. As advanced radar systems, have 
improved ships’ targeting abilities, and improvements in rocket and warhead technology 
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have increased the range and destructive capability of surface-launched missiles, 
potentially replacing the aircraft carrier and its air wing in the strike warfare role.  
Multi-purpose surface ships equipped with the AEGIS radar system and vertical 
launch system (VLS), such as the Ticonderoga-class cruiser offer a modular strike 
alternative. Increasing previous missile payloads from 88 to 122, the VLS configuration 
can employ an array of weapons spanning across land-attack, anti-surface, anti-air, and 
anti-submarine capabilities.68 The major benefit of these systems, as Commander Phillip 
E. Pournelle argues, is in their cost efficiency when compared to an air wing; smaller 
surface ships are cheaper to purchase, and the missiles do not require delivery from a 
costly air wing.69 Additionally, the United States could deploy a flotilla of approximately 
64 low-cost, missile-laden surface ships into an A2/AD environment in order to distribute 
their strike capabilities over a wider area, thereby complicating an adversary’s targeting 
solution and delivering a strike capability comparable to that of several air wings.70 
The use of submarines as an alternative strike platform to the aircraft carrier 
builds on the surface combatant argument, but adds the tactical benefit of operating under 
the water’s surface, complicating an adversary’s maritime domain awareness. The U.S. 
Navy converted four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into a conventional 
land attack role (SSGN) between 2002 and 2007.71 Armed with 155 conventional 
Tomahawk missiles, an SSGN maintains some of the same benefits of an aircraft carrier 
(i.e.: operating a strike platform from international waters) and without the susceptibility 
of surface combatants to ASCMs. 
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2. Critique of the Missile Carriers 
A missile-centric force, some argue—whether based on the surface or under the 
sea—provides a more cost and risk efficient alternative in an A2/AD environment than 
the aircraft carrier. Pournelle argues in support of these alternatives:  
Missile carriers are far more combat-effective and survivable than aircraft 
carriers because of the rapid volume of fire they can deliver, the 
distribution in several shooters, and the low signature relative to an aircraft 
carrier…The ability to deliver a massive strike rapidly means the 
launching platform can rush in, execute the mission, and withdraw. The 
carrier, on the other hand, must remain vulnerable to attack while the air 
wing is launched and recovered through multiple cycles.72 
Pournelle’s argument specifically, and the support of missile carriers in general, fails to 
account for several shortfalls.  
First, missile carriers do not provide a significantly greater strike capability than 
the current air wing. A six-destroyer Surface Action Group (SAG) following Pournelle’s 
recommended loadout would carry 288 TLAMs. Based on Benjamin Lambeth’s report 
for RAND Corporation, however, one air wing provides “the target-coverage equivalent 
of 4,000–5,000 TLAMs over the course of a 30-day operation.”73 Additionally, any 
capacity advantage missile carriers might provide is quickly negated when one considers 
their re-load capability. As Seth Cropsey, Bryan C. McGrath, and Timothy A. Walton 
describe in their report for the Hudson Institute, there is currently no method for re-
arming the Navy’s Mk 41 VLS system at sea.74 This capability shortfall, therefore, would 
require any missile carrier to depart the area of operations to re-arm, sacrificing valuable 
time during its transit.75 
Second, a missile-centric force does not account for two critical capabilities of 
airpower: its scalability, and its contribution to battle-space awareness. When an aircraft 
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takes off, it can escalate its response to a threat starting with a show-of-presence, 
escalating to a show-of-force, and terminating with an eventual kinetic strike. A missile, 
however, is only capable of the latter. While this discrepancy is of arguably less value in 
the middle of a conflict, the ability to provide a scalable response can help in avoiding or 
deescalating tensions in the early stages of a crisis.  
With regards to battle-space awareness, there is currently no missile-based 
alternative to the capabilities of carrier-based aircraft. The mainstay of an air wing’s 
airborne command and control and situational awareness capabilities are the E-2C and E-
2D Hawkeye variants, and the Navy currently lacks a sea-based alternative that can 
provide the same duration or sensor capabilities. While land-based alternatives exist in 
the form of the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), relying on 
such assets in a maritime environment would assume the availability and survivability of 
allied airfields in the midst of conflict—a dangerous presumption that forgoes the tactical 
benefits of maneuver warfare.76 
Surface and submarine forces, armed with a myriad of strike capabilities, provide 
an additive benefit to the aircraft carrier in an A2/AD environment. Their ability to 
deliver quick hits against an enemy’s missile launchers or command and control targets 
can help reduce the risks to conducting carrier operations, and the modularity of their 
VLS payloads can enable a transition from a strike to an air defense role—albeit for a 
limited time based on their inventory. Arguing for their total replacement of the aircraft 
carrier, however, does more to highlight their capability shortfalls than promote their 
strengths. While a missile-centric force cannot replace the current capabilities of carrier-
based aviation, other proposals promote transitioning from a few large super carriers and 
towards more, smaller carriers. 
3. Escort Carriers and LHDs 
Arguments in favor of transitioning to smaller aircraft carriers acknowledge the 
value of sea-based air, but argue against the financial and tactical costs of building a 
platform that is becoming “big, expensive, and vulnerable–and surprisingly irrelevant to 
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the conflicts of the time.”77 Some of the proposed benefits of this transition include: 
reduced operating costs, an increase in available funds for more production, the 
distribution of air power across a larger number of ships and over a wider geographic 
area, and a reduction in the risk of suffering mass casualties aboard a single ship.78 While 
these benefits appear viable at first glance, closer inspection reveals several critical 
shortfalls in three areas: the types of aircraft required, air wing size, and vulnerability.79 
The aircraft available for different ship designs are directly related to the size of 
the ship. Current U.S. amphibious carriers (LHDs and LHAs) do not incorporate a 
catapult or arresting gear system. Additionally, they do not utilize the ski-jump flight 
deck that is popular in other foreign iterations of aircraft carriers. Therefore, fixed-wing 
aircraft on U.S. amphibious carriers rely on Vertical/Short Take-Off, Landing (VSTOL) 
capabilities for their launch and recovery. The nature of VSTOL technology significantly 
limits the range of capabilities aircraft can pursue. Consider the AV-8B Harrier and its 
combat radius of approximately 300 nautical miles as compared to the near 1,000 nautical 
miles of the F/A-18E Super Hornet. Comparing the VSTOL and carrier-suitable version 
of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter provides a more equitable comparison: 450 nautical miles 
versus 600 nautical miles.80 If VSTOL aircraft are limited in range compared to their 
non-VSTOL alternatives, and if a main argument against the viability of the super carrier 
design is its inability to operate outside the range of an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities, 
then an alternative carrier design that relies on VSTOL aircraft does not alleviate the 
military problem of an A2/AD environment. 
The second shortfall of the smaller carrier argument is the impact on air wing 
size, which in turn affects mission capability and sortie rate. Inherently, a larger ship 
platform can accommodate more aircraft than a smaller one. An ability to accommodate 
more aircraft also allows for more mission specialization amongst airframes. For 
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example, a Wasp-class LHD in a sea control role can embark up to 20 AV-8B Harriers 
(although it routinely only carries six), and the USS Wasp is expected to deploy with 16 
F-35Bs in 2017.81 Conversely, a typical carrier air wing’s fixed-wing component 
includes 44 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for air superiority and strike warfare, five EA-18G 
Growlers for electronic attack, and four E-2C/D Hawkeyes airborne early warning. Thus, 
the super carrier model allows for a wider range of aircraft capable of performing a larger 
range of mission sets simultaneously. The LHD/LHA model, however, can only provide 
a ground-attack asset and currently lacks any airborne early warning capability.82   
With respect to sortie rate, a smaller carrier design–with its smaller air wing–
would have fewer aircraft available for sorties at any given time when compared to a 
super carrier. A 2015 Congressional Budget Office analysis reports that the future LHA-6 
class of amphibious assault ships (a re-designed version of the LHA-1 class that includes 
a well-deck) will have a per unit cost of $3.7 billion.83 At nearly one-quarter the cost of 
the Ford (CVN-78), the Navy could potentially make up for the sortie shortfall of a single 
smaller carrier by purchasing more LHDs/LHAs. Unfortunately, sortie capabilities do not 
scale so efficiently. Comparing the Ford-class to a French Navy Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier modernized to include advanced launch and recovery systems shows the 
smaller carrier provides only a fraction of financial savings (approximately 22%), but at 
extreme costs in operational capabilities (a 53% decrease in embarked aircraft, 225% less 
aviation fuel storage, and 383% less munitions storage).84 
Finally, current ship designs for small and medium sized aircraft carriers are no 
less susceptible to the same A2/AD threats aimed against super carriers.85 Cropsey et al. 
also highlight that the smaller model’s decreased fuel and ammo capacity would require 
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additional logistics support, straining what they identify as an already strained supply 
system.86 Thus, divesting from the super carrier towards the current LHA/LHD model 
provides a significant decrease in operational capability while accepting the same, if not 
higher, level of risk. 
C. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR CHANGE 
While the proposed alternatives for replacing the aircraft carrier contain several 
shortfalls, there remain several avenues for improving the aircraft carrier’s viability in an 
A2/AD environment. Specifically, the Navy can reconsider the doctrinal role the aircraft 
carrier plays in its maritime strategy. Also, there are multiple avenues for addressing the 
aircraft carrier’s chief weapon system: the air wing. 
1. Doctrinal Roles 
The aircraft carrier has played several different roles since its inception in the 
early 1900s. Professor Robert C. Rubel of the Naval War College classifies them into six 
categories: (1) “Eyes of the Fleet”; (2) “Cavalry;” (3) “Capital Ship;” (4) “Nuclear-Strike 
Platform;” (5) “Airfield at Sea;” and (6) “Geopolitical Chess Piece.”87  
The aircraft carrier’s progression along each role reflected the capability 
developments in aircraft striking power and ship survivability. As the air wing’s striking 
power increased, air wings transitioned from scouting and spotting (“Eyes of the Fleet”) 
towards striking and disrupting enemy naval operations (“Cavalry”). Increased 
survivability of the aircraft carrier, coupled with continuing advancements in air wing 
performance, allowed for direct and sustained engagements with an enemy’s fleet 
(“Capital Ship”). In the nuclear age, the Navy sought to repeat the aircraft carriers’ 
cavalry role by utilizing their speed to provide pulsing nuclear-armed air strikes and 
survive any nuclear or conventional retaliation (“Nuclear-Strike Platform”).88  
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In areas without a significant threat to an aircraft carrier’s survival, military 
operations have utilized aircraft carriers as “Airfields at Sea,” capitalizing on the carrier’s 
and air wing’s capabilities to deliver near-continuous air support within a theater of 
operations. The challenge with this role, however, has been the need for carriers to 
operate ever closer to an adversary’s shores due to the air wings’ shrinking range. Finally, 
as a product of their substantial cost and the technological innovations required for their 
operation, the United States has used aircraft carriers as a form of strategic 
communication (“Geopolitical Chess Piece”) to demonstrate “American concern, resolve, 
or outright anger.”89 
As contemporary A2/AD capabilities increase the risk to aircraft carriers 
operating as airfields at sea, military leaders must consider operating the ships further out 
to sea. The current air wing can continue to provide a scout and spot capability, with its 
MH-60R helicopters searching for enemy submarines, the E-2D providing early warning 
and battlespace awareness, and its F/A-18 variants maintaining local air superiority. 
Additionally, tactical experimentation focusing on emissions control techniques and 
multi-carrier engagements may restore the ships’ cavalry role. Unfortunately, this 
methodology only provides an innovative change in how the Navy uses its current 
capabilities; it does not address improving the air wing’s susceptibility to advanced air 
defenses or modernizing the aircraft within the air wing.90 
2. Changing the Air Wing 
Larger aircraft carriers have the added benefit of being able to incorporate new 
technological advancements. Considering that aircraft carrier hulls are intended to last 
more than 40 years, their design must accommodate advancements both in launch and 
recovery systems and airframes. The USS Midway (CV-41), for example, originally 
embarked an air wing comprised of propeller-driven aircraft after its commissioning in 
1945, and did not include steam-driven catapults. By its decommissioning in 1991, 
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however, the Midway had launched A-6 Intruders, F/A-18 Hornets, EA-6B Prowlers, and 
E-2C Hawkeyes off of its modernized flight deck in support of Operation Desert Storm.91  
The chief complaint against the modern air wing is its decreased effective range. 
Hendrix, Rubel, McGrath, Cropsey, and current Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. 
Work agree that addressing this shortfall is a critical step regardless of the aircraft 
carrier’s long-term future. Reducing or stopping the purchase of the F-35C and replacing 
it with a renewed purchase contract for more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, as Hendrix 
recommends, provides a stop-gap measure, marginally increasing the air wing’s average 
range from 725nm to 789nm while also increasing the average payload capacity from 
8,443 pounds to 15,920 pounds per aircraft.92 Additionally, modernization in the air 
wing’s weapons systems can extend the reach of their lethal touch. By adding the Joint 
Stand-Off Weapon-Extended Range (JSOW-ER) and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) to the air wing’s arsenal, defense planners would 
extend the aircraft carrier’s strike range by 250nm and 500nm respectively.93 Providing 
sea-based air with the ability to deploy its weapons from further out, while avoiding an 
adversary’s IADS, would also improve the aircraft carrier’s ability to fill the cavalry role 
or even serve as an airfield at sea. 
Improving the performance and range of manned aircraft and their weaponry has 
a limited potential. If the present trend in A2/AD ranges continues to grow, then manned 
aircraft will eventually reach their maximum performance limit: the physiological 
constraints of the human body. One way of offsetting this trend is to incorporate the use 
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the air wing. While the Navy has faced 
several institutional, financial, and technological challenges developing a carrier-based 
UAV, the Navy has made great strides in this endeavor recently, with Northrop 
Grumman’s X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator (UCAS-D) conducting 
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autonomous take-offs, aerial refueling, and recoveries aboard the USS George H. W. 
Bush (CVN-77) in 2013.94  
The X-47B specifically, and future UAVs in general, demonstrate a game-
changing modernization to the air wing in terms of range, payload capacity, and low-
observability characteristics.95 Initial testing of the X-47B demonstrated a range of 
2100nm–roughly the same distance between the continental U.S. and Hawaii.96 Such a 
radical increase in range in comparison to current manned aircraft, combined with the 
removal of aircrew endurance requirements (potentially lasting several days with aerial 
refueling), provides the aircraft carrier with several options based on payload. For 
instance, the UAV can provide a persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) capability far ahead of the carrier strike group. If armed, the low-
observable aircraft could reach mobile targets within an adversary’s A2/AD wall without 
jeopardizing the lives of aircrew.  
Such results are still over the horizon, however, and incorporating UAVs into the 
air wing will continue to face technological, financial, and institutional barriers towards 
its adoption. In the long run, however, UAVs represent a strong candidate for 
modernizing the air wing and restoring the efficacy of the aircraft carrier in an A2/AD 
environment.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The advancements in military capabilities designed to counter the United States’ 
ability to project power and influence operations on the land from the sea pose a 
significant risk to the aircraft carrier and its air wing. Strategically, the Navy no longer 
enjoys the freedom to maneuver its carriers within a battlespace and must entertain the 
idea of attaining only temporary sea control over a specific area. Operationally, the Navy 
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must consider operating aircraft carriers further from the shore, reducing the effectiveness 
of an air wing due to their reliance on aerial refueling. 
Several alternative systems attempt to alleviate these challenges and, as some of 
their proponents argue, relegate the aircraft carrier either into diminished importance or 
even obsolescence. As this chapter demonstrates, however, no single proposed system 
can totally replace the range of capabilities aircraft carriers provide, nor do they decrease 
the value of sea-based air. Additionally, this chapter demonstrates that the aircraft carrier 
and its air wing, in their current form, face significant operational challenges, and 
capability shortfalls. Rather than signaling the death knell of the aircraft carrier, however, 
the A2/AD challenge highlights the need for the Navy to consider innovative new 
employments of the aircraft carrier, and the need to look critically at airframes that 
comprise the air wing. If the Navy does not take this opportunity to adapt the aircraft 
carrier to the challenges it faces, then the ships will be of little more value than the 
battleships they replaced. 
While there are valuable operational and tactical lessons for U.S. military leaders 
to draw upon from both the case studies and analysis of alternatives, continued 
advancements in modern land-based systems create geo-strategic issues for a military 
response. In order for the United States to counter the strategic implications of A2/AD 
capabilities, it must first re-evaluate its strategic aims. Only after identifying the ends of 
its strategy can the United States properly identify the ways and means necessary to help 
it reach its objectives. 
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Modern anti-access/area denial capabilities pose a significant threat to the Navy’s 
ability to operate in an A2/AD environment in general, and its ability to employ its 
aircraft carriers specifically. Additionally, contemporary A2/AD capabilities threaten the 
United States’ freedom of action within the maritime commons to effectively conduct sea 
control and project power ashore in order to “defeat aggression, respond to crises, and 
strengthen partnerships.”97  This thesis utilized each of these areas of concern as a basis 
for determining innovative operational and technical solutions U.S. political and military 
leaders should consider when determining the future of the aircraft carrier in U.S. 
maritime strategy. 
This thesis first discussed the technical characteristics of contemporary A2/AD 
systems and their parallels to previous A2/AD capabilities in World War II and the Cold 
War in order to demonstrate how innovative operational solutions can both mitigate the 
risk to aircraft carriers, and restore the United States’ ability to project power ashore. The 
significance of the lessons learned is that they demonstrate how the United States can 
better address its A2/AD concerns while utilizing its existing fleet structure and 
capabilities. 
Next, the thesis turned towards the debate regarding the possible technical 
solutions the U.S. Navy could pursue in order to address the capability shortfalls of its 
aircraft carriers and air wings in an A2/AD environment. The analysis in this section 
demonstrated that, although the proposed alternatives show potential promise in 
increasing the Navy’s ability to strike shore-based targets, none of the alternatives can 
sufficiently provide the range of necessary capabilities across a range of military 
operations as the aircraft carrier and its air wing. It is important to note, however, that the 
analysis acknowledged the need for technical improvements in the aircraft carrier’s 
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defensive capabilities and the capabilities of naval aircraft, and provided several 
recommendations for how U.S. leadership ought to proceed. 
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In describing the viability of the aircraft carrier as a component of U.S. sea power 
in an A2/AD environment, the analysis in this thesis has revolved around how best to 
achieve the current aims of U.S. maritime strategy through military means—whether 
through innovative operational approaches, capability enhancements, or both. One area 
this thesis has not discussed, but certainly bears asking, is what are the non-military 
components of maritime strategy the United States can pursue in countering A2/AD 
capabilities.  
Emphasizing the use of naval diplomacy is an excellent means for U.S. maritime 
strategy to counter the rise, and deter the use, of A2/AD capabilities. Geoffrey Till 
describes “naval diplomacy” as ranging from “limited compellent attack at one extreme, 
through deterrence to amicable cooperation at the other. The aim is to influence other 
people.”98 Till also notes that, like all other forms of diplomacy, naval diplomacy can 
have “a wide range of purposes and effects.”99  The key in applying naval diplomacy as a 
deterrent against A2/AD capabilities and their strategies lies in correctly identifying these 
appropriate purposes and effects. 
Reconsider Tangredi’s portrayal of anti-access strategies as “great walls” whose 
purposes are to consolidate power within, and block intruders from without. If anti-access 
capabilities (anti-ship missiles, anti-satellite weapons, etc.) are the wall itself, and present 
U.S. military capabilities are not sufficiently capable of breaking down the wall directly, 
then naval diplomacy offers an ability to erode the foundation under the wall, or even 
attack the power behind the wall indirectly, thus preventing the capabilities from 
achieving their political objectives. Therefore, some appropriate targets for naval 
                                                 




diplomacy are China’s territorial claims, and its need for control of the commons for its 
domestic prosperity. 
A maritime strategy built around an increased role for naval diplomacy does not 
ignore the benefit of the use of force, or in developing military capabilities. Under such a 
strategy, the United States can and should continue to pursue research and development 
in technology capable of overcoming the shortfalls in its current naval forces. 
Fortunately, by building a strong diplomatic foundation with an anti-access state, 
however, these military advancements need not be seen as backhanded or two-faced. 
Instead, the United States can justify its pursuits by using its established relations to ease 
China’s fears, arguing that developing its capabilities is necessary for other threats in 
other regions, and that failing to do so would be to invite unnecessary risk. Such 
advancements would also lend increased credibility to the United States’ deterrence 
against any anti-access strategy. 
There are several ways U.S. maritime strategy can use naval diplomacy to erode 
the foundation of China’s anti-access strategy. First, the United States can continue to 
demonstrate its support of, and commitment to, the international norms codified in the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Consistent use of what the 
Navy calls “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FON), such as sailing within China’s 
claimed territorial seas of Subi Reef, or conducting military activities in and over China’s 
Economic Exclusion Zone, undermine China’s legal warfare and demonstrate the United 
States’ resolve to protecting the commons to the international community.100 
Additional options for the use of naval diplomacy involve different means of 
including China in the collective security apparatus. By finding opportunities for 
multilateral cooperation, as naval historian John B. Hattendorf argues, “neighboring 
navies in a particular region can join forces and share responsibilities costs for 
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surveillance, and control of maritime regions. These shared duties could prevent conflict 
that could arise from neglect.”101   
Both the 2007 Cooperative Strategy and the 2015 version offer recommendations 
that could enhance cooperation. The 2007 strategy noted that maritime forces could 
“build confidence and trust among nations through collective efforts that focus on 
common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world.”102 Speaking 
specifically in regards to China, the 2015 strategy refresh highlights counter-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and 
involvement in multi-national naval exercises as plausible opportunities for increased 
maritime relations between China and the United States.103   
In light of these objectives, the United States and China have successfully 
executed several combined anti-piracy operations since 2012, and China attended its first 
“Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) exercise in 2014.104 Conducting such operations, and 
capitalizing on what Hattendorf refers to as the “triple criteria of shared values, 
geographical proximity, and shared interests,” is improving naval cooperation, preventing 
misunderstanding, and building a history of shared solutions to crises.105 The overall 
objective of building such a relationship lies in the bringing of a state employing A2/AD 
capabilities into the shared protection and access of the contested region, thereby eroding 
the desire for building or exercising its A2/AD capabilities.   
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C. CONCLUSION 
Sea control, power projection and ensuring access to the maritime commons, for 
both commercial and military use, are central functions of the United States’ national 
maritime strategy. Modern A2/AD capabilities target the United States’ ability to perform 
these functions. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review summarizes the significance of 
these capabilities:  
Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project 
power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing 
actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. 
capabilities to project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security 
partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and 
influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.106 
There is a definite need for the United States to address its capability shortfalls in the face 
of A2/AD capabilities, but the threat against aircraft carriers does not nullify their value, 
nor does it signal the end of its history.   
The aircraft carrier has served a critical role in U.S. maritime strategy due to its 
operational flexibility in transporting and delivering air power across the world’s oceans 
without requiring foreign basing rights, and its adaptability to changing airframes. Just as 
modern A2/AD capabilities have taken an evolutionary step from previous attempts to 
counter the United States’ military advantage, so too can the aircraft carrier respond with 
incremental, evolutionary improvements. In the meantime, the United States has several 
operational methods it can utilize to mitigate the risk to its naval forces, while 
simultaneously pursuing non-military avenues for dissuading a state to employ its A2/AD 
capabilities. The time will most likely come when a capability signals the end of the big 
deck aircraft carrier as a viable component of naval sea power. Today’s big missiles are 
not that threat, and today is not that time.  
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